Responsibility, culpability and the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders: objectives in conflict by Peay, Jill
  
Jill Peay 
Responsibility, culpability and the 
sentencing of mentally disordered 
offenders: objectives in conflict 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Peay, Jill (2016) Responsibility, culpability and the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders: 
objectives in conflict. Criminal Law Review (3). pp. 152-164. ISSN 0011-135X  
 
© 2016 Sweet & Maxwell 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64221/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Responsibility, Culpability and the Sentencing of  Mentally Disordered 
Offenders: Objectives in Conflict 
Jill Peay* 
 
 
‘The issue on appeal to this court is whether the judge's sentence of custody for life 
was wrong in principle. It raises once again the complex relationship between custodial 
sentences and orders under the MHA in relation to an offender who suffers from a mental 
disorder.’1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Assessing culpability in mentally disordered offenders poses complex challenges for 
both lawyers and psychiatrists. But this issue has become both more pressing and more 
problematic following the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in Vowles and others.2  
The guidance in Vowles concerns sentencing and disposal decisions and raises many of the 
same dilemmas that have bedevilled the assessment of the degree of responsibility in 
someone where there is a plea or finding of diminished responsibility manslaughter: as 
Lord Justice Moses put it, this is  ‘a question of acute difficulty'.3    This article reviews some 
of those dilemmas both from the perspective of the court and from that of the psychiatrists 
who become involved.  For the courts the dilemmas seem to revolve primarily around 
management of the perceived future risk posed by mentally disordered offenders. For the 
psychiatrists, they concern primarily the ethically problematic issue of contributing to 
decisions about punishment. 
 
Psychiatrists’ involvement with the criminal courts can occur in a number of ways, but 
two are of concern here. First, they may give expert evidence in relation to s.2 of the 
Homicide Act 1957 as amended. This evidence will go to the issue of the level of the 
conviction, potentially reducing a murder conviction to one of manslaughter by reason of 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science.  I am grateful for the comments I 
received when I delivered a version of this paper to the Royal College of Psychiatrists at the Third UK 
Conference on Philosophy and Psychiatry ‘Moral and legal responsibility in the age of neuroscience’ 24th 
September 2015; and for comments emanating from the editorial process. 
1 Lord Justice Aikens Fort [2013] EWCA Crim 2332 at para 5. 
2 Vowles and others [2015] EWCA Crim 45. 
3 Welsh [2011] EWCA Crim 73 at para 11. 
diminished responsibility.  This is not ethically problematic.  Second, they may give 
evidence or submit expert reports where an offender has been convicted and there are 
concerns that the offender’s mental state at the point of sentence may render him or her 
suitable for disposal under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA). This is also not 
problematic, since the psychiatrist’s contribution will be potentially to divert the offender 
from a punitive disposal to a therapeutic one under s.37 or s.37/41 of the MHA. However, 
since amendment by the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, disposal under s.45A of the MHA – 
the hospital and limitation direction – has also been available to the courts.4 This hybrid 
disposal enables the judge to order a sentence of imprisonment, but direct that the offender 
goes first to hospital for a period of treatment under the MHA.  It is thus a mixed 
therapeutic-punitive sentence which Eastman and Peay described in 1998 as potentially ‘a 
substantial change of psychiatric jurisprudence as applied to all MDOs’.5 We called at that 
time for the operation of the Act to be ‘closely monitored’.6 
 
Involving psychiatrists in a part-punitive order is ethically profoundly problematic for 
them in the same way that their involvement was in the now repealed ‘longer than normal 
sentences’ under the s.2 (2) (b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991.7  As doctors, psychiatrists 
are first enjoined to ‘do no harm’, or as Sokol has put it more appropriately ‘do no net 
harm’; and even following this more nuanced edict entails balancing other moral 
principles.8  Yet the s.45A hybrid order necessarily draws psychiatrists into considerations 
of punishment, albeit second-hand where their recommendations on the applicability of a 
therapeutic order are used in part to justify the part-punitive order; or by the back door 
where patients are transferred from hospital to prison.  
 
When the 1997 Act was passed the s.45A hybrid order applied only to offenders 
suffering from psychopathic disorder.  For the first ten years of its operation it was used 
rarely, with numbers never rising into the teens in any one year.9   The Mental Health Act 
2007 extended its application to offenders suffering from any form of mental disorder 
which fell within the revised MHA 1983. However, by 2013 there were still only 18 orders 
made in that year; this contrasted markedly with the 294 hospital and restriction orders (a 
non-punitive order) made under s.37/41 in the same year.10  This article draws in part on an 
                                                     
4 Amended by s.46 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. 
5 N. Eastman and J. Peay, ‘Sentencing Psychopaths: Is the “Hospital and Limitation Direction” an Ill-
Considered Hybrid?’ [1998] Crim. L.R. 93-108 at 108. 
6 Ibid at 108. 
7 B. Solomka, ‘The role of psychiatric evidence in passing “longer than normal” sentences’ (1996) 
Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 7,2, 239-255. 
8 D. Sokol ‘”First do no harm” revisited’ (2013) British Medical Journal 347:f6426. 
9 See J. Peay  'Sentencing Mentally Disordered Offenders: conflicting objectives, perilous 
decisions and cognitive insights' (2015) LSE Legal Studies Working Paper 1/2015 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549653 
10 Ibid at p.5. For reasons discussed in the working paper these figures should be treated with some 
caution. 
analysis of the tranche of Court of Appeal cases in s.45A orders.11 But it also considers the 
implications of the post Vowles and others  era, guidance having now been given in the 
Court of Appeal that s.45A orders are to take precedence over s.37 or s.37/41 orders.12  And 
hence the substance of this article: the anxiety about involving psychiatrists in the 
assessment of culpability second-hand, and the difficulties of assessing culpability per se in 
mentally disordered offenders. 
 
 
Responsibility and culpability 
One of the reasons this area is so tricky has to do with language.  Legal responsibility 
is used here as a binary concept to distinguish those found guilty from those found not 
guilty (a lay/jury decision about conviction). Where there is no legal responsibility (either 
by way of acquittal or by way of a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity) there can be 
no punishment.  For those found guilty the use of the term culpability, in essence 
blameworthiness, then regulates in part the nature, quantity and quality of the 
punishment/disposal that follows. This judicial decision is one that theoretically should be 
in proportion to moral blameworthiness for desert-based theorists or for consequentialists, 
by reference to the impact punitive intervention has on the offender's subsequent 
behaviour; for example through deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation. Under s.142(1) 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (CJA) these purposes of sentencing are blended, together 
with the need for offenders to make reparation for their offences to those affected by those 
offences.  And the case law illustrates that culpability is a graded concept:  it can range 
from full, through various degrees of partial, to wholly absent – albeit punishment for 
those with no mens rea culpability can still occur for strict liability offences.   
 
But lawyers also sometimes use responsibility/culpability interchangeably. And, the 
neat division breaks down most obviously with respect to mentally disordered offenders 
charged with murder, where concepts of diminished responsibility can come into play. A 
plea to diminished responsibility manslaughter can be accepted by the judge, or 
diminished responsibility can found by a jury following a contested murder trial. 
Diminished responsibility is used in a graded way with frequent case reference to 
responsibility being ‘diminished but not wholly extinguished’.13   Thus, diminished 
responsibility can lie at the top end, just short of a conviction for murder, or at the lowest 
end where it can be almost non-existent (some element will necessarily exist given there 
has been a conviction).  
 
Psychiatric involvement in cases of potential diminished responsibility is inevitable. 
Moreover, since the amended s.2 of the Homicide Act 1957 now makes reference not to 
diminished responsibility but to a defendant’s impaired abilities to do particular things and 
                                                     
11 Ibid. 
12 See fn 2  above. 
13 See, for example, Lord Mustill in Birch (1990) 90 Cr App R 78. 
to the need for a causal/explanatory relationship to be established between the defendant’s 
abnormal mental functioning and the homicide, it makes psychiatrists central to the 
process of evaluation. Indeed, the CA has noted in Brennan that the amended s.2 is 
altogether more tightly structured than the original value-judgement infused s.2, and that 
‘most, if not all, of the aspects of the new provisions relate entirely to psychiatric matters’.14  
Indeed, the CA has expressed itself content for psychiatrists to express a view on the 
‘ultimate’ issue as to whether there was substantial impairment.15  
 
However, do psychiatrists and lawyers share common concepts in this area? Indeed 
do all lawyers share the same concept?  This is tricky. As James Penner has illustrated it is 
perfectly understandable that lawyers and psychiatrists can use the same concepts, without 
agreeing about the properties such concepts represent.16  He argues that acquiring a 
concept, in this case like responsibility or culpability, can come cheap, whilst acquiring 
knowledge of its properties may be much more hard won:  knowledge requires 
investigation and thought. Thus, we can share the same concept but have many different 
beliefs about it and we can disagree about them.  Concepts have an essential quality, his 
example being that even children don’t believe that you can convert a horse into a zebra by 
painting stripes on it, whilst they still recognise that dogs come in all different colours. 
Thus, we can use the same word – for example, culpability – without necessarily referring 
to the same constituent elements. This can make culpability a dangerously unstable 
concept. Indeed, whilst there are statutory offence based limits with respect to cardinal 
proportionality, and the relevant Sentencing Council Guidelines further refine these, there 
is no natural limit to how much punishment is justified by how much offending. As Lacey 
and Pickard have argued, drawing on the work of Murphy, a desert-based model can be 
justice based with a respect for responsible agency, but it can also be vulnerable to emotive 
and retaliatory sentencing.17  The two are not compatible.  Combining an unstable concept 
with the CJA's blended approach to the purposes of sentencing and then adding in the new 
element of MHA disposal, means the evaluation of culpability will inevitably stray outside 
the strict confines of a sentence of imprisonment subject to the sentencing guidelines.  The 
moral equation is opened up in unpredictable ways.  
 
Two illustrations of the problem from two different cases should suffice. First, 
Clarence, who killed her three disabled children. Her plea to diminished responsibility 
manslaughter was accepted by the judge.  At sentence the judge took the view that both 
her responsibility for the offences and her culpability were low, since her mental disorder 
                                                     
14 Brennan [2014] EWCA Crim 2387, paras 49-51. 
15 Ibid at para 51, citing Ormerod's paper on diminished responsibility available on the Judicial 
College website; see also commentary by Fortson [2015] Crim L R 291-294. 
16 J. Penner ‘Concepts and Rules: A Philosophically-Minded Introduction to Private Common Law 
Reasoning’ (2015). Paper presented at the LSE Law Department 2nd July 2015. 
17 N. Lacey and H. Pickard ‘The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment 
in Contemporary Social and Political Systems’ (2015) Modern Law Review 78, 2, 216-240; citing, at 226,  J. 
Murphy Punishment and the Moral Emotions (2012) Oxford, OUP. 
wholly accounted for these offences – they would not have happened in the absence of her 
severe depression.18  So whatever planning had gone into the killings, and the fact that the 
three children would have been smothered sequentially, introducing an important time 
element, did not enhance her culpability since, as the judge said, what you did ‘was a 
product of your mental illness’.  In contrast, the prosecution asserted that even though her 
culpability may be low, her responsibility was significant: indeed, a plea to manslaughter 
by reason of diminished responsibility necessarily entails both an acceptance of an 
intention to kill (in these circumstances three times) and of a degree of responsibility for 
that. The prosecution submitted that a prison sentence should be imposed.  The judge gave 
Clarence a s.37 hospital order, asserting that she did not qualify for a s.41 restriction order 
or a s.45A order since she wasn’t dangerous.   Clearly it is possible for the courts to be 
satisfied, on the basis of medical evidence, that a mental disorder can produce offending in 
a way that all but extinguishes both responsibility and culpability, even though the offence 
involves elements of premeditation, planning and takes place in a non-spontaneous way. 
 
Contrast this with the case of Brennan19 where there was a contested diminished 
responsibility trial and the jury returned a verdict of murder. Brennan worked as a male 
escort and in a particularly savage manner, killed a client who he said required him to 
engage in degrading acts. At his trial, there was uncontested psychiatric evidence to the 
effect that he was suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning which arose from 
Schizotypal Disorder and Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder and which 
substantially impaired his ability to form a rational judgment and to exercise self-control at 
the relevant time. There was evidence of premeditation, but the psychiatric expert told the 
court that the undoubted preparations and planning did not affect her diagnosis: ‘Core 
rationality is still retained by people with severe disorders...such people can present a 
facade of being entirely rational’ (para 31).  In cross-examination she added ‘The planning 
for the killing was a logical consequence of his illogical thought process. He has the 
illogical thought that he has to kill someone and then goes about planning it in a logical 
way’ (para 33). Thus, setting up a situation to kill was not inconsistent with him 
experiencing profound mental health problems. He was 'driven by an abnormal, out of 
control, belief system at the point of killing' (para 33).  However, the judge invited the jury 
to consider the weight to place on the defendant’s ability to conduct his life in many 
respects coherently and normally (even though there had been uncontradicted medical 
evidence on this point). He told the jury they did not have to ‘buy into [Dr M’s] conclusions 
in their entirety to the degree that she suggests is appropriate’.  
 
The jury convicted of murder and the Court of Appeal, in due course, quashed the 
conviction for murder on the grounds that there was no rational basis on which the jury 
could decline to accept the expert evidence (thus, the judge had wrongly invited the jury to 
                                                     
18 https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/r-v-clarence-sentencing-remarks.pdf 
19  See fn 14  above; and commentary by Fortson [2015] Crim L R 291-294. 
enter into an essentially psychiatric domain).20  And whilst cases of uncontradicted 
psychiatric evidence may be rare, it is notable that the Court of Appeal was also prepared 
to embrace within its test for withdrawal other evidence that was too tenuous to permit a 
rational rejection of diminished responsibility.  This potentially will give further weight to 
the role of psychiatric testimony.21 
 
Why was the treatment by the trial courts of Clarence and Brennan so different? In the 
first the judge accepts a plea, in the second a trial occurs.  Contrasts can be drawn between 
the nature of the killings (domestic vs ‘sexual’), the savagery of the killings (smothering 
small children vs knifing and clubbing with a hammer), and the nature of the diagnoses 
(Depression vs Schizoidal Disorder and Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder).  But 
seemingly the issues of culpability and responsibility could be equated, both 
psychiatrically and legally, since the offenders’ disorders were the explanation for the 
occurrence of the offences.  However, what is clear is that in the final analysis, both of these 
cases were heavily influenced by psychiatric reasoning.  
 
 
 
Vowles and s.45A orders 
The judgment in Vowles and others has already been subject to an extensive critique in 
this Review by Professors Ashworth and Mackay.22 Suffice it to reiterate that they argue (1) 
it is not for psychiatric expertise to determine what part the mental disorder plays in 
assessing culpability, but rather advise as to the disorder's part in the offending behaviour 
(2) the Court placed an inappropriate emphasis on punishment not treatment, reversing the 
presumption in earlier cases and (3) the Court emphasised the role of any ‘element or 
particle of responsibility for wrongdoing’23 and the importance of finding the most suitable 
disposal with reference to the method of release and risk posed.  The latter acknowledges 
the reasoning in the Attorney General’s Reference No 54 of 201124  that release is to be 
preferred by the Parole Board rather than by the First Tier (Mental Health)Tribunal for two 
reasons. First, the Parole Board needs to be satisfied that the defendant is no longer a 
danger to the public for any reason and is not at risk of relapsing into dangerous crime; 
whereas the under the hospital order regime release depends on there being no danger 
which arises from the offender-patient's medical condition. Second, recall from licence 
arrangements can occur if a danger to the public arises from criminal activity; whereas 
recall to hospital is available only if the defendant’s medical condition relapses.  Thus, 
                                                     
20 Thus, the judge should have withdrawn the murder charge from the jury following Galbraith 
(1981) 73 Cr App R 124.  Fortson, above, identifies the key passage in the judgment at para 44  'Where 
there simply is no rational or proper basis for departing from uncontradicted and unchallenged expert 
evidence then juries may not do so'.  
21 Brennan para 65. 
22 A. Ashworth and R. Mackay [2015] Crim L R 542-547.  
23 Ibid at 545. 
24 Attorney General’s Reference No 54 of 2011 [2011] EWCA Crim 2276 at para 17. 
following Vowles, the pure therapeutic approach looks to take second place to a mixed 
precautionary punitive approach.25  
 
Since s.45A orders fall under the MHA how might the Court of Appeal in Vowles have 
become so focussed on punishment?  When they were first introduced the s.45A orders 
created a disposal option for offenders suffering from psychopathic disorder, where a 
judge had already rejected a recommendation for a s.37/41 order because of an offender’s 
high culpability for the offence or because of the serious risk the offender posed to the 
public.26  As such, that small cohort of treatment rejectees who would have been sentenced 
to custody became open to the new mixed punitive-therapeutic order.  The order both 
encouraged psychiatrists to have a therapeutic go with the difficult to treat psychopathic 
offenders, and retained a cautious and flexible approach to release.27 Indeed, this latter 
element, of public protection, ultimately became dominant in the government’s thinking.28  
The s.45A order also, paradoxically, provided a way of avoiding the then new automatic 
life sentence under s.2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997: paradoxically because this 
avoidance measure was not to apply to any other offender suffering from mental 
disorder.29 
 
The decision in Vowles arguably turns this on its head. The judgment asserts that 
where medical practitioners suggest that an offender is suffering from mental disorder, and 
where the offending is wholly or in significant part attributable to the mental disorder, and 
treatment is available, and a hospital order may be the appropriate way of dealing with the 
case, then the courts should first consider using a s.45A order. Only once that has been 
rejected should they consider the s.37 or s.37/41 order.  Yet, if the offending was wholly or 
in significant part attributable to the mental disorder that would seemingly imply that 
culpability was low or absent.  Logically, it should result in a real shift in the numbers from 
the use of s.37/41 orders to the s.45A order. 
 
One can only assume, since the Court of Appeal used Vowles as the leading case in this 
guidance on s.45A, that they could have considered this defendant suitable for such an 
                                                     
25 Commentary by A. Ashworth [2015] Crim L R 921-922 on the post Vowles cases of Turner [2015] 
EWCA Crim 1249; Gaciano [2015] EWCA Crim 980 and Smith (Gregory) (unreported) shows that the 
Courts have drawn on Vowles in an inconsistent way. Indeed, as Ashworth points out, the Court in Turner 
makes explicit reference to Vowles but at no point mentions s.45A orders. Indeed, the judgment makes 
early reference to para 51 of Vowles which asserts 'There must always be sound reasons for departing 
from the usual course of imposing a penal sentence'; and notes that the original sentencing court had no 
grounds to impose a MHA disposal. 
26 See Birch (1990) 90 Cr App R 78 at 89;  and Peay 2015 above. 
27 See Eastman and Peay (1998) above at 96. 
28 Ibid at 97. 
29 See Drew [2003] UKHL 25. 
order had it been available to them.30  Vowles was the quintessential case of someone with a 
difficult background who was difficult to diagnose, difficult to place, difficult to treat and 
yet who was still considered dangerous. She had borderline personality disorder, had 
made a previous suicide attempt leading to brain damage, had previous psychiatric 
admissions, and had set fire to newspapers in a flat day the day after she discharged herself 
from hospital. A psychiatric report said she was 'not likely to benefit from admission to 
hospital' and the trial court gave her an IPP (an indeterminate sentence for public 
protection) sentence with an 18 months tariff. She was later transferred to hospital under 
s.47 of the MHA. 
 
In the event, the Court of Appeal took the view that she was most appropriately left on 
her s.47 transfer order; and rejected the psychiatric opinion favouring a s.37/41 order. Of 
the other five cases brought together with Vowles, the three which most clearly involved 
mental illness, and a causal connection was asserted, had their sentences quashed and 
replaced with s.37/41 orders. The other three, including Vowles, were characterised as cases 
where either a drug addiction was regarded as the driving force behind the defendant’s 
behaviour,  or punishment was justified by the offender’s high culpability and continuing 
risk to the public, or, in Irving’s case below, that the causative link was insufficient.    The 
cases are an object lesson in just how problematic these issues are: all the offenders had 
long, complex histories with multiple diagnoses, some co-occurring and some conflicting 
contemporaneously between assessing psychiatrists. Psychiatric diagnosis may be both an 
art and a science, but its conclusions are clearly subject to the vagaries of time and location. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting of the six is that of Irving.  First because it illustrates how 
the Court looked askance at some of the psychiatric evidence it had reviewed. Thus ‘mental 
illness ….is not a passport to a medical disposal as many of the psychiatric opinions we 
have considered in this case appear to presume’ (emphasis in original).31  And secondly, 
because the Court makes explicit observations on the graded nature of causative links. 
Thus, at para 197  
 
‘Acknowledging that there is no necessity for the sentencing judge to be satisfied of a 
causal link between a defendant's mental disorder and the offences in order to make a 
hospital order under s.37 or to direct hospital admission under s.45A it remains a 
legitimate factor to weigh in the balance of the circumstances as a whole.’ 
 
In Irving’s case the causal link was not sufficient to conclude that the sentencing judge was 
wrong in principle to impose a prison sentence rather than a hospital order (despite, 
notably, that Irving had been held on a s.47/49 order since 2002, having been sentenced to 
life imprisonment with a minimum term of eight years in 1997).  
                                                     
30 The order was not available in any of the six cases as they had all been sentenced prior to the 2007 
amendments. Indeed, Irving had been sentenced prior to the initial introduction of the S.45A order. 
31 Vowles and others above at para 196. 
 All of this could support a conclusion that the Court of Appeal, following its own 
guidance, would probably have given three s.45A orders in place of the s.37/41 orders it 
imposed (the offending was wholly or in significant part attributable to the disorder – low 
culpability) and in the three other cases the sentence of imprisonment would have been left 
in place (on the basis of culpability, insufficient causation or ‘autonomous’ drug addiction). 
Thus, the traditional notion of the s.45A order as providing an option for treatment in cases 
of high culpability and high risk would be all but extinguished. And the future s.45A 
orders would draw not from the potential prison population, but from the potential s.37/41 
population.  This would, in turn, create real ethical difficulties for psychiatrists. And, 
ironically, run counter to the oft neglected observations of the House of Lords in Drew that 
they would need to be persuaded that any significant change in the prevailing practice was 
desirable given ‘the difficulties caused to prison managements by the presence and 
behaviour of those who are subject to serious mental disorder’.32  Giving s.45A orders to 
those who would otherwise receive s.37/41 orders would do just that, albeit not 
immediately. 
 
 
 
The lessons of the existing s.45A appeal cases. 
One further feature of the Vowles case is the discernible shift to a more sceptical approach 
to psychiatric evidence.  Thus, the Lord Chief Justice, in giving the Court's general 
guidance about the approach to dealing with mentally disordered defendants, noted ‘the 
judge must carefully consider all the evidence in each case and not, as some of the early 
cases have suggested, feel circumscribed by the psychiatric opinions’.33  Given the 
understandable lack of precision in psychiatric diagnosis one can have some sympathy 
with the difficult position in which the Court finds itself. However, this seeming preference 
for a lay/legal based assessment of culpability over a medical based assessment of capacity 
as impaired by disorder or frank mental illness can also be seen in the Court's handling of 
the tranche of s.45A appeals.34  The capacity-causality nexus can be conceived as two 
interlinked sliding scales filling the space between non-responsibility and full culpability. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
 
If the courts will use sufficient residual culpability to negate the use of s.45A, how 
frequently are they likely to find residual culpability amongst those with mental illness? 
This question explicitly excludes those with severe personality disorder/psychopathic 
disorder, the original intended subjects of the s.45A order. This is because it seems 
                                                     
32 Drew [2003] 1 WLR 1213 at para 22. 
33 Vowles para 51. 
34 For an analysis of the tranche of ten cases see Peay 2015 above; and see now also Graciano [2015] 
above. 
inevitable that this group will be counted out from an initial hospital-based disposal on the 
grounds of higher culpability, and a continuing risk due to the reduced prospects of 
therapeutic success. In the Court’s reasoning, such factors make desirable, if indeed not 
necessary, any ultimate discharge through the Parole Board and not the First-tier Tribunal 
(Mental Health).  Perhaps ironically, in one of the few post Vowles cases, that of Turner, the 
Court was prepared to quash an IPP sentence and replace it with a s.37/41 order on the 
basis that the offender had already spent the equivalent of a 17 year determinate term in 
confinement, where the original court viewed her offences as meriting a 3 year determinate 
term.35  Whatever culpability had been present, had thus already been richly rewarded.  
 
Two cases are telling in the Court's general approach to assessing residual culpability in the 
mentally ill.  First Cooper.36  Cooper pleaded guilty to diminished responsibility manslaughter and 
attempted murder. The two offenses were separated by a brief car drive, and it was accepted that 
the offences would not have occurred but for his acute psychotic state. The court distinguished 
between the first offence where his responsibility was held to be significantly diminished, and the 
second, which was cast more as an act of revenge for which he retained significant culpability. The 
time gap was deemed significant in a way it was seemingly not in Clarence.  The court also gave 
some weight to the fact that his illness may have been brought about by a much earlier usage of 
illegal drugs (for which he was held responsible) and from which he may have been suffering from 
the effects of withdrawal. Cooper was given two IPPs and a s.45A order. 
 
Second Fox37.  Fox was found guilty of kidnapping and grievous bodily harm with intent in the 
context of an acute psychotic breakdown.  Five psychiatric opinions agreed his culpability was very 
low as the disorder caused the offences.  But the court rested culpability on issues such as the 
formation of his intention to cause grievous bodily harm, his choice to take alcohol before the 
offences, taking deliberate measures to effect his escape, and being able to drive. For both of the 
latter the psychiatric evidence was that this was consistent with being in the grip of psychosis.  
Perhaps most curiously, the court also cited Fox's failure to resist his command hallucinations: 
choosing not to follow his ‘good voices’ implied the capacity to choose.  Finally, they engaged in 
some 'reverse reasoning', implying the trial judge must have thought Fox bore a significant degree of 
responsibility because a s.45A order was made, together with an IPP.   
 
In both of these cases the Court of Appeal supported the trial judges in favouring 
traditional methods of assessing culpability: and rejected psychiatric opinions favouring 
s.37/41 disposals.  Thus, any element of drug or alcohol abuse or elements of pre-
meditation, planning, or attempts to cover-up the offence or escape the scene all contribute 
to a view that partial culpability exists.  Partial culpability pre Vowles could result in a 
s.45A disposal. Post Vowles it looks more likely to favour a prison disposal. 
 
                                                     
35 Turner [2015] above at paras 50-51. 
36 Cooper  [2010] EWCA Crim 2335. 
37 Fox [2011] EWCA Crim 3299. 
 Assessing culpability: the challenges 
Sentencing convicted ordered offenders under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the 
Sentencing Council Guidelines is governed primarily by an assessment of the seriousness 
of the offence, which in turn rests on the harm caused or intended by the offender, together 
with his or her culpability.38  Culpability in ordered offenders is based on a number of 
different factors, some of which are offence specific, and some are more generally 
applicable. Planning, premeditation, the targeting of vulnerable groups and previous 
convictions all commonly feature.  Mental illness or disability in convicted offenders 
formally indicates significantly lower culpability.39  However, the Sentencing Guidelines 
are not specific about the extent of this reduction in culpability or how it is to be assessed in 
specific offenders, albeit the latest Theft Guideline does make clear that a medical condition 
can make a community order a proper alternative to a moderate custodial sentence.40  The 
Australian case of Verdins also gives helpful indications of why punishment should be 
reduced; assessing by how much is the more difficult task.41  How, when considering the 
use of s.45A, are judges to fix the punitive part of the sentence? Should it simply be done 
by reference to the conventional culpability factors, with a discount applied?  But this 
would imply that an offender’s mental disorder is somehow divisible from his or her 
otherwise ordered behaviour.  This is a trap that the Court of Appeal has already once had 
to avoid in Brennan42 but is it one that will now also regularly occur in the s.45A cases?  
Cooper and Fox above illustrate just how difficult some of these issues are once psychiatric 
evidence (which is not always so conveniently uncontradicted as it was in Brennan) arises.  
And post Vowles, as in the case of Graciano, the Court may find itself concluding that 
culpability could not have been wholly extinguished because the defendant did not seek a 
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, had pled guilty to diminished responsibility and 
had 'retained some significant elements of rationality'.43 In rejecting the views of three 
psychiatrists, who all recommended that Graciano be subject to a s.37/41 order, the Court 
upheld the IPP with a s.45A order asserting that in so doing it was reflecting the guidance 
in Vowles.44 
 
Clearly, some psychiatric reasoning runs counter to the intuitive assessments of culpability 
that sentencing judges have developed over years of sentencing ordered offenders.  Yet as 
Freckelton and List have noted, with respect to defendants with Asperger’s, these cases are 
not easy for lay assessors.45 Not only are threshold issues of diagnosis instantly less 
                                                     
38 See Sentencing Council Guidelines Overarching Principles: Seriousness 2004 at para 1.15. 
39 Ibid at para 1.25. 
40 Sentencing Council Guidelines  Theft Offences Definitive Guideline 2015 at page 6. 
41 Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of Victoria. 
42 See above. 
43 Graciano [2015] above at paras 20-21. 
44 At para 23. 
45 I. Freckelton and D. List ‘Asperger’s Disorder, Criminal Responsibility and Criminal Culpability’ 
(2009) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 16, 1, 16-40. 
compatible with a legal approach, making culpability assessments difficult in those with 
mental disorder, but also because judges and juries can be misled without counter-intuitive 
guidance ‘about the risks of drawing over ready (and inaccurate) inferences from the 
unusual manner of interviewees with Asperger’s disorders.’  For those with longer 
memories, these arguments are redolent of those which took place around the Confait 
Inquiry: arguments on suggestibility and the risk of false confessions by vulnerable 
interviewees were only put to rest by the sterling work of, amongst others, Gudjonsson.46  
 
Freckleton and List identify as the most difficult challenge for the courts that of moving 
‘from the general to the specific – to isolate means of evaluating whether and to what 
extent the potential identified .....has been realised in the particular case and operated in a 
real sense upon the relevant conduct of the person’.47  This, they argue, is a task for which 
the courts will require assistance from mental health professionals.   
 
Where this relates to the issue of conviction, it is aproblematic for such professionals. But 
where it relates to sentence/disposal, it is ethically more problematic.  And the risk for the 
mental health professionals is that a report prepared for one purpose may colour the 
conclusions of the court on another.  As Commane has eloquently pointed out, 
observations made by clinicians in their reports for trial can be reproduced by the judge in 
reasoned decisions on sentence.48  
 
The difficulties of assessing culpability, and the prior question of responsibility, in those 
with mental disorder are widely evidenced beyond this jurisdiction. Psychiatric 
commentary on the Breivik case in Norway acknowledges not only the conflicting 
psychiatric assessments over time, but also the court's reliance on a series of (non-
psychiatric) common-sense alternative explanations for Breivik’s statements and 
behaviours. As Melle judiciously observes 'The evaluation of what went on in a person's 
                                                     
46 Report of an Inquiry by the Hon. Sir Henry Fisher into the circumstances leading to the trial of three 
persons on charges arising out of the death of Maxwell Confait and the fire at 27 Doggett Road, London, SE6. 12th 
December 1977, HMSO, London; available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228759/0090.pdf ; and G. 
Gudjonsson   The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook (2003) John Wiley and Sons, 
Chichester. 
47 Freckelton and List at page 36. 
48 C. Commane ‘Criminal Responsibility and Personality Disorder’ (2015) Paper presented to the 3rd 
UK Conference on Philosophy and Psychiatry, Royal College of Psychiatrists, London 24th September 
2015. Commane cites the example of the Dennehy case. Dennehy received a whole life order for her 
multiple offences of the utmost gravity; the judge was clear that her personality disorders/psychiatric 
condition, on which there was psychiatric evidence, afforded no mitigation.  Yet the judge (at p.17) in 
rejecting her protestations of remorse with respect to the attempted murder convictions, cited what she 
had said to the psychiatrist pre-conviction: see    https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/the-queen-v-dennehy-sentencing-remarks-28022014.pdf      
mind while committing a crime will, despite technical innovations, in the end continue to 
rely on personal evaluations and interpretations'.49 
 
 
Conclusions 
The attractions to the courts of s.45A orders should be obvious: superficially, they offer a 
therapy-based response to offenders with evident need but combine this with both 
punishment for residual culpability and the possibility of an indefinite incapacitative 
sentence where offenders pose the highest risk.  They also ensure that release is via the 
more trusted Parole Board and recall can be achieved on the basis of the risk of future 
criminality and not only on the basis of a deterioration in the offender’s mental health. As 
such, they enable the courts to duck the hard issue of dividing offenders into those who are 
ill and require treatment and those who ill but require punishment. And provide a vehicle 
for managing perceived future risk.  But these orders, given that they may, post Vowles, 
draw from the s.37/41 population and not from the prison population, run counter to the 
House of Lords cautionary words in Drew. S.45A cases now have the potential to dominate 
the sentencing of all mentally disordered offenders thought in need of some element of 
hospital disposal since any element of culpability will seemingly suffice.  Even those 
offenders whose offending is 'wholly accounted for' by their disorders are eligible for the 
s.45A disposal as a first choice. 
 
From the perspective of psychiatrists the orders enhance their ethically problematic 
position of when advising the courts. They also potentially send to treating clinicians a 
group of offenders who may be more treatment resistant because of the prospect of a 
transfer to a prison environment should effective progress in therapy occur. Indeed, the 
hybrid order may sustain a fear of transfer to prison which may in itself be damaging. 
Ultimately, in the eyes of psychiatrists, s.45A orders can result in the less effective post-
release supervision which they believe follows on from release from prison.50   
 
Whilst the courts have long experience in assessing the culpability of mentally ordered 
offenders, it is unclear how these approaches apply to mentally disordered offenders. The 
existing restraints on the use of punishment are vulnerable to the emotive issues identified 
by anxious desert theorists; therapy risks, in these circumstances, having a punitive edge.  
Judgments under uncertainty, as most if not all of these decisions about s.45A entail, are 
notoriously problematic51 and perhaps acutely so in these decisions about mentally 
disordered offenders where perceptions of risk are pervasive and outcomes necessarily 
long-coming.52 
                                                     
49 I. Melle 'The Breivik case and what psychiatrists can learn from it' (2013) World Psychiatry 12, 16-
21. 
50 See, for example, Turner [2015] at paras 41-42 and 52. 
51   D. Kahneman Thinking, Fast and Slow. (2012) Penguin, London; A. Tversky and D. Kahneman 
‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’ (1974) Science, New Series, 185, 4157: 1124-1131. 
52 See Peay 2015 above. 
 The assessment of culpability in the context of mental disorder is rudimentary.  The courts 
seem to have been applying traditional approaches but it is not clear how valid these are in 
the context of acute mental disorder.  Psychiatrists give expert opinion on the relationship 
between mental disorder and seemingly purposeful activity, but this isn’t always heeded 
by the courts. In the area of diminished responsibility the Court of Appeal has been clear 
that psychiatric evidence cannot rationally be rejected on the basis of tenuous ‘lay’ opinion 
or common-sense understandings. But with respect to sentence and disposal psychiatrists 
are in a more difficult position.53 It may be that psychiatrists want this position to remain 
ambivalent, to avoid becoming involved in ethically problematic decisions about 
punishment, but in retreating they risk having imposed on them offender-patients under 
legal provisions they may regard as both anti-therapeutic and unnecessarily dangerous to 
the public in the long term, where therapeutic release is trumped by Parole Board release.   
 
Finally, it is arguable on the basis of the analysis of the s.45A cases that clinicians and 
lawyers may be using different language to get at similar phenomena. Thus, capacity and 
causation are counterpoised.  Perhaps this is merely the traditional tension between free 
will and determinism.  However, it is ironic that psychiatric dominance will occur where 
clinicians may feel least comfortable on empirical grounds (namely, that the illness wholly 
accounted for the behaviour and the causative link was high);  and lawyers work with 
concepts that require high capacity for culpability to be attributed, such as planning and 
motivation. But capacity may be a concept with which they in turn feel less comfortable; 
and it is one that is more clearly associated with psychiatric modes of discourse.  Hence, 
neither side rests on firm ground. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Capacity- Causality Nexus 
 
 
                                                     
53 Ironically, psychiatrists may be better positioned to advise on the possibilities relating to disposal, 
than to the certainties required for conviction: see A. Buchanan and H. Zonana ‘Mental disorder as the 
cause of a crime’ (2009) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32: 142-146. 
 
  
